Serving as a Backup Plan: Accounting Reserves and Their Impact on Managerial Risk-Taking by Lui, Kun
University of South Carolina 
Scholar Commons 
Theses and Dissertations 
Spring 2020 
Serving as a Backup Plan: Accounting Reserves and Their Impact 
on Managerial Risk-Taking 
Kun Lui 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd 
 Part of the Business Administration, Management, and Operations Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lui, K.(2020). Serving as a Backup Plan: Accounting Reserves and Their Impact on Managerial Risk-
Taking. (Doctoral dissertation). Retrieved from https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/etd/5887 
This Open Access Dissertation is brought to you by Scholar Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in 
Theses and Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Scholar Commons. For more information, please 
contact dillarda@mailbox.sc.edu. 
SERVING AS A BACKUP PLAN:  
ACCOUNTING RESERVES AND THEIR IMPACT ON MANAGERIAL RISK-TAKING 
 
by 
 
Kun Liu 
 
Bachelor of Science in Business Administration 
Salem State University, 2012 
 
Bachelor of Science in Business Administration 
Henan University, 2012 
 
Master of Science in Accountancy 
Bentley University, 2014 
 
 
 
Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements 
 
For the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy in 
 
Business Administration 
 
Darla Moore School of Business 
 
University of South Carolina 
 
2020 
 
Accepted by: 
 
Scott Jackson, Major Professor  
 
Ling Harris, Major Professor 
 
Andrew Newman, Committee Member 
 
Priyali Rajagopal, Committee Member  
 
Bryan Stikeleather, Committee Member 
 
Cheryl L. Addy, Vice Provost and Dean of the Graduate School
ii 
© Copyright by Kun Liu, 2020 
All Rights Reserved.
iii 
DEDICATION
 To my parents, for their unconditional love, their continuous involvement in every 
single step of my life, and their invaluable support in me no matter what decisions I 
make. To my awesome advisor and big sister, Dr. Ling Harris, for patiently guiding me 
through my Ph.D. program step by step and teaching me how to conduct high-quality 
academic research. This dissertation would have not been possible without you. To my 
mentor, Mellinda Abbott, for opening the door of accounting for me and showing me 
how exciting accounting could be. To my mentor, Dr. Jay Thibodeau, for encouraging me 
to continue pursuing my goal of becoming an excellent accounting researcher and 
educator. I can only hope to inspire others as you have inspired me. To the Stikeleather 
family, my American family, for all the laughs and hugs. I will do my best to become the 
best auntie Kun ever. To Sterling, for making me truly believe that everything will be 
fine and giving me hope during the darkest time of my life. Finally, to my dear friends, 
Jing and Anan, for always being there for me and making my life as a Ph.D. student 
FUN.
iv 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
 I thank my dissertation committee members Scott Jackson, Ling Harris, Andrew 
(Drew) Newman, Priyali Rajagopal, and Bryan Stikeleather for their invaluable guidance 
and continuous support. I am also grateful for the helpful suggestions and feedback 
provided by Jonathan Gay, Stefan Hill, Ethan LaMothe, Mary Marshall, Joel Owens, 
Spenser Seifert, Macy Weller, James (Yibo) Zhang, and workshop participants at the 
University of South Carolina and Mississippi State University. 
v 
ABSTRACT
 This study examines how accounting reserves influence firms’ internal decisions. 
In particular, this study investigates whether and how reserves currently reported in a 
firm’s balance sheet affect managerial risk-taking in the making of capital investment 
decisions. The experimental results show that firm managers are more likely to take risks 
in the making of capital investment decisions when the amount of reserves is large 
compared with when it is small. Additionally, the amount of reserves influences 
managerial risk-taking through sequentially influencing managers’ perceived risks of 
missing relevant earnings targets and managers’ perceived risks of investing in risky 
capital investment options. These findings contribute to the accounting literature and they 
have implications for firm managers by providing evidence regarding the real economic 
consequences of exercising accounting discretion. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION
Firms use earnings to communicate with external stakeholders and when making 
internal decisions (Dichev et al. 2013). Accounting reserves currently booked in a firm’s 
balance sheet (hereafter “reserves”) can be released to increase reported earnings in the 
future. Because there is a dollar-for-dollar inverse relationship between changes in the 
levels of reserves and the levels of earnings (ignoring income taxes), reserves can 
influence firms’ external reporting choices and internal decision-making. A considerable 
amount of academic and professional literature has investigated whether and how 
reserves play a role in earnings management which is an external reporting choice that 
firms make (e.g., Levitt 1998; Healy and Wahlen 1999; Loomis et al. 1999; Nelson et al. 
2002, 2003; Abarbanell and Lehavy 2003; Kokoszka 2003; Graham et al. 2005; Petrovits 
2006; Jackson and Liu 2010). However, there is only limited research that examines how 
reserves affect firms’ internal decisions.  
This study examines the impact of reserves on firms’ internal decisions by 
focusing on firm managers’ capital investment decisions. Specifically, this study 
examines whether and how reserves reported in a firm’s balance sheet influence 
managerial risk-taking in a capital investment decision-making context. Focusing on 
capital investment decisions is critical for three reasons. First, making capital investment 
decisions is one of the most fundamental, relevant, and significant tasks undertaken by 
firms (Hubbard 1998; Goodman et al. 2014). Second, capital investments significantly 
2 
influence firms’ market values and their long-term existence (McConnell and Muscarella 
1985; Klammer et al. 1991). Third, capital investments play a key role in the growth and 
productivity of the economy (Biddle and Hilary 2006; Biddle et al. 2009).  
Prior research suggests that reserves are viewed by financial executives as “a 
cushion against earnings hits” (Canace et al. 2016, p. 28) in the future. Specifically, 
financial executives believe that reserves provide their firms with a safety net that enables 
them to avoid income-decreasing surprises in a business environment surrounded by 
uncertainties. This managerial view of reserves as a “cushion” against potential earnings 
hits is similar to individuals’ views of backup plans as “safety nets” or as “insurance” 
against outcome uncertainty (Napolitano and Freund 2015, 2016). Additionally, 
managers could release reserves to help achieve relevant earnings targets when reported 
earnings fall short of targets. This potential use of reserves is like the potential use of 
backup plans to help achieve desired outcomes when initial plans fail. Therefore, this 
study argues that managers are likely to view reserves as part of a backup plan to assist 
their firms to achieve relevant earnings targets. 
According to the prior psychology literature, having backup plans in place not 
only increases individuals’ perceived control over achieving future desired outcomes, but 
it also reduces individuals’ perceived uncertainty in terms of achieving future desired 
outcomes (e.g., Napolitano and Freund 2016, 2017). Because perceived control 
(perceived uncertainty) influences the affective (cognitive) dimension of perceived risk 
(Greifeneder et al. 2011), having backup plans in place reduces an individual’s perceived 
risk that desired outcomes will not be achieved. As discussed previously, managers may 
view the possession of reserves as being a backup plan that helps them achieve a relevant 
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earnings target. Therefore, possessing reserves could influence managers’ perceived risks 
in the same way that backup plans do. That is, the possession of reserves can alleviate a 
manager’s perceived risk of missing a relevant earnings target. Further, since a large 
(versus small) amount of reserves is more likely to help a firm achieve its earnings target, 
managers’ perceived risks of missing a relevant earnings target is likely to be lower when 
the amount of reserves is large compared with when the amount of reserves is small.  
As a cognitive feeling, managers’ perceived risks of missing a relevant earnings 
target will be used as a source of information in capital investment decisions that 
incorporate risky investment options (Schwarz and Clore 2007; Greifeneder et al. 2011; 
Schwarz 2011). Specifically, when the perceived risk of missing a relevant earnings 
target becomes lower, the potential risk embedded in a risky investment option becomes 
less salient for managers. In other words, those managers who perceive a lower risk of 
missing a relevant earnings target also perceive a lower risk of investing in a risky option. 
As a result, these managers will be more likely to invest in the risky option.  
Based on the discussion above, I expect that a large (versus small) amount of 
reserves will induce managers to be more likely to invest in a risky option when making 
capital investment decisions. This is due to the sequential reduction of managers’ 
perceived risks of missing a relevant earnings target and perceived risks of investing in a 
risky option. Apart from this predicted influence of reserves on managerial risk-taking, it 
is evident that there are other factors that could affect this predicted influence. 
Specifically, I focus on the source of relevant earnings targets—whether a firm’s earnings 
targets are determined by parties internal or external to a firm (e.g., Dechow and Skinner 
2000; Mohanram 2003; Graham et al. 2005; Hirst et al. 2008).  
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I employed a 2 × 2 between-subjects factorial design, manipulating the reserves 
amount at two levels (large versus small) and the source of earnings targets at two levels 
(internal versus external). I also included two control conditions in which only the source 
of relevant earnings targets, and not the reserves amount, is manipulated. Participants 
assumed the role of a financial executive who works for a hypothetical company and who 
is required to select one of two proposed machines to purchase. I recruited 303 
participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform and found the following results. 
First, managers are more likely to take risks, i.e., to invest in a risky option, in their 
capital investment decisions when the amount of reserves currently reported in their 
firm’s balance sheet is large compared with when it is small. By design, the risky option 
also generates a higher expected return for the firm and the results suggest that a large 
amount of reserves facilitates economically efficient managerial risk-taking. Second, 
reserves influence managerial risk-taking through sequentially influencing managers’ 
perceived risks of missing a relevant earnings target and managers’ perceived risks of 
investing in a risky capital investment option. This result provides evidence as to why 
reserves affect managerial risk-taking. Finally, whether a relevant earnings target is 
determined internally or externally does not influence how reserves affect managerial 
risk-taking.  
My study contributes to several streams of accounting literature. First, my study 
provides evidence relating to the real effects of accounting discretion. The establishment 
of reserves is an example of discretionary accounting choices that managers make on 
behalf of their firms. The results—that a large amount of reserves facilitates 
economically efficient managerial risk-taking in capital investment decisions—suggest 
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that discretionary accounting choices have an impact on firms’ real decisions and affect 
the allocation of resources in the economy (Kanodia 2007; Kanodia and Sapra 2016).   
Second, my study enriches the stream of accounting literature that identifies the 
factors that potentially influence managerial risk-taking. Factors identified by extant 
literature include (1) Characteristics of individual decision makers such as managers’ 
affective reactions (Moreno et al. 2002) and (2) Managerial accounting practices such as 
executive stock options (Rajgopal and Shevlin 2002), budget levels in budget-based 
contracts (Sprinkle et al. 2008), and the power of financial incentives (Brink et al. 2017). 
By focusing on reserves, my study documents that discretionary accounting choices made 
for external financial reporting purposes also influence managers’ risk-taking behavior.  
Finally, since reserves are a central implication of conservatism (Jackson and Liu 
2010), my study speaks to the stream of literature that challenges the move made by 
standard setters to exclude accounting conservatism from the joint FASB and IASB 
conceptual framework (FASB 2010; IASB 2010). By moving away from conservatism 
and towards neutrality, standard setters aim to reduce information asymmetry between 
firms and financial statement users. However, several studies have documented the 
benefits arising from conservatism; for example, conservatism mitigates information 
asymmetry and it facilitates the alignment of interest between managers and 
shareholders/debtholders (e.g., LaFond and Watts 2008; Balakrishnan et al. 2016). My 
study shows that a large amount of reserves could induce efficient managerial risk-taking 
in capital investment decisions. Since reserves are one of conservatism’s “central 
implications” (Jackson and Liu 2010, p. 566), conservatism could serve as a mechanism 
to facilitate economically efficient capital investment decisions and thereby reduce 
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potential conflicts in the manager-shareholder relationship. Therefore, my study provides 
additional evidence that supports the benefits of accounting conservatism.   
The remainder of this study is organized as follows: Section 2 provides 
background information about reserves and discusses similarities between reserves and 
backup plans. Section 3 formulates hypotheses. Sections 4 and 5 describe the experiment 
and discuss the results. The final section summarizes the study and discusses limitations 
and the opportunities for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2 
BACKGROUND
2.1 Reserves 
Reserves booked in a firm’s balance sheet can be subsequently released to 
increase reported earnings in the firm’s income statement. Specifically, a firm can build 
up reserves over time by understating net asset values and then release reserves in 
subsequent periods by reversing all or part of those understatements (Levitt 1998; Watts 
2003; Jackson and Liu 2010). 
For example, recognizing bad debt expenses in a firm’s income statement requires 
that a reserve account, namely, allowance for bad debts, be shown in the balance sheet to 
bridge the gap between expense recognition and cash flows. Over time, increases 
resulting from write-offs being consistently lower than bad debt expenses accumulate in 
the allowances for bad debts. At the end of a period, there is scope for firms to adjust the 
assumptions adopted to estimate the allowances for bad debts in order to reduce the 
amounts. The reduction in the allowances for bad debts results in a decline in the bad 
debt expenses recognized in income statements and this eventually increases the earnings 
reported in the period.  
2.2 Backup plans  
Individuals develop backup plans to help them manage uncertainty (Napolitano 
and Freund 2015; Shin and Milkman 2016). Generally speaking, backup plans are 
alternative means developed but not initially (or ever) used to increase the probability of 
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achieving a goal (Napolitano and Freund 2016). During the course of pursuing goals, 
individuals sometimes fail to achieve their desired goal using the plan they initially 
implemented, i.e., their first-choice plan, and they can replace their first-choice plan with 
a backup plan and then continue pursuing their goals (Napolitano and Freund 2017).  
Backup plans consist of three main characteristics (Napolitano and Freund 2015, 
2016, 2017). First, backup plans and first-choice plans are both aimed at achieving the 
same goal. Second, backup plans and first-choice plans are not used concurrently when 
pursuing a goal. Instead, when first-choice plans are implemented, backup plans are 
reserved for possible later adoption. Third, once first-choice plans fail to achieve a goal, 
individuals can turn to backup plans to continue their pursuit of goals, thereby increasing 
the probability of achieving their goals.  
2.3 Reserves and backup plans 
I argue that reserves and backup plans are similar in two ways. First, the evidence 
suggests that a psychological similarity exists between reserves and backup plans. 
Financial executives interviewed by Canace et al. (2016) suggest that they create and 
maintain reserves with the intention of providing “a cushion against earnings hits” 
(Canace et al. 2016, p. 28) in the future and this assists them “hedge against 
uncertainties” (Canace et al. 2016, p. 25). Furthermore, a CFO interviewed by Graham et 
al. (2005) indicated that the presence of reserves helps to “project his/her company in a 
better light” (Graham et al. 2005, p. 41) in the event of earnings shortfalls. CFOs in 
general also prefer to “bank” reserves “for use in later time periods” (Graham et al. 2005, 
p. 43). These managers’ perceptions of reserves, documented in the accounting literature, 
are similar to individuals’ views regarding backup plans documented in the psychology 
9 
literature. Specifically, individuals perceive that backup plans serve as a “psychological 
insurance policy” (Shin and Milkman 2016, p. 2) and a “safety net” (Napolitano and 
Freund 2015, p. 89; Napolitano and Freund 2016, p. 56; Shin and Milkman 2016, p. 3) 
against outcome uncertainty.  
Second, in addition to this psychological similarity, reserves and backup plans are 
similar in a practical way. A relevant earnings target can be achieved through a firm’s 
reported earnings and by way of a firm releasing some or all of its reserves. This is 
similar to the first characteristic of backup plans, namely, that both first-choice plans and 
backup plans lead to the same desired outcome. Moreover, reserves are built upon a 
firm’s balance sheets over time and they may be used when a firm’s reported earnings 
fail to achieve relevant earnings targets. In other words, reserves are initially set aside and 
potentially used to increase reported earnings to the desired level when reported realized 
earnings are below a relevant earnings target. This is similar to the second and third 
characteristics of backup plans in that backup plans are reserved for the future and used 
only when first-choice plans fail to achieve desired outcomes. To summarize, the 
managerial action of releasing booked reserves to achieve a relevant earnings target when 
reported earnings fall short of a target is similar to the individual action of implementing 
developed backup plans to achieve a desired outcome when initial plans fail to do so.  
Consistent with the discussion above, the psychological and practical similarities 
between reserves and backup plans suggest that firm managers may perceive reserves as 
a backup plan that can be used to help achieve a desired earnings target.  
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CHAPTER 3 
HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT
 
3.1 Reserves and perceived risk 
 
The prior psychology literature shows that the mere development of backup plans, 
rather than the actual implementation of backup plans, influences individuals’ 
perceptions and decision-making (e.g., Shin and Milkman 2016). On the one hand, 
having backup plans stored for potential later use increases individuals’ perceived control 
over achieving future desired outcomes. This is because individuals believe that being 
able to implement a backup plan when needed can increase the likelihood of achieving 
their desired outcomes (Weisz and Stipek 1982; Skinner 1996; Napolitano and Freund 
2016; Shin and Milkman 2016; Ryon and Gleason 2018). On the other hand, having 
backup plans in place alleviates individuals’ perceived uncertainty about achieving future 
outcomes because backup plans are developed for the specific purpose of managing 
uncertainty (Napolitano and Freund 2015, 2016). According to Slovic (1987)’s two-
dimensional theory of perceived risk, perceived control impacts upon the affective 
dimension of perceived risk, and perceived uncertainty influences the cognitive 
dimension of perceived risk.1 Since having backup plans increases perceived control and 
 
1 The affective dimension is affected by a perceived lack of control, feelings of dread, 
and perceived fatal consequences. The cognitive dimension is affected by the extent to 
which tasks are regarded as unobservable, unknown, uncertain, new, and delayed in 
producing undesirable impacts (Slovic 1987). 
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reduces perceived uncertainty, having backup plans in place reduces individuals’ 
perceived risks of failing to achieve desired outcomes in the future. As previously 
discussed, firm managers may view reserves as a backup plan to help achieve a relevant 
earnings target in the event of earnings shortfalls in the future. Therefore, reserves could 
influence managers’ perceptions of risks in the same way that backup plans do. That is, 
reserves currently reported in a firm’s balance sheet can reduce a firm’s management’s 
perceived risk of missing a relevant earnings target in the future. Specifically, a large 
amount of reserves, compared to a small amount of reserves, can inflate a firm’s reported 
earnings by a greater extent and, eventually, it is more likely to help the firm achieve its 
relevant earnings target. Therefore, managers’ perceived risks of missing a relevant 
earnings target is likely to be lower when the amount of reserves is large compared with 
when it is small. 
3.2 Perceived risk as information for subsequent decisions 
 Perceived risk falls into the category of cognitive feelings (Kim et al. 2015).2 
Prior research shows that cognitive feelings can be used as an informational input in 
making subsequent judgments, independently of the source that induces them (Schwarz 
and Clore 2007; Greifeneder et al. 2011; Schwarz 2011). Specifically, in my setting, 
managers who know that a large (or small) amount of reserves is currently reported in 
their firm’s balance sheet make capital investment decisions that involve risky investment 
options. Managers will unintentionally interpret the perceived risk of missing a relevant 
 
2 Cognitive feelings include experiential states that are associated with memory and 
thinking processes and manifest themselves in much the same way as affective and 
bodily feelings (Greifeneder et al. 2011; Schwarz 2011). 
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earnings target generated by having a large (or small) amount of reserves as if it were 
informative about their capital investment decisions.  
When the amount of reserves is large (versus small), managers experience a lower 
perceived risk of missing a relevant earnings target. This lower perceived risk of missing 
a relevant earnings target will be used in capital investment decisions as an informational 
input, making the potential risk embedded in a risky investment option less salient for 
managers. In other words, those managers who perceive a lower risk of missing a 
relevant earnings target also perceive a lower risk of investing in a risky option. As a 
result, these managers will be more likely to invest in the risky option.  
Taken together, I predict that a large (compared to small) amount of reserves 
makes managers more likely to invest in a risky investment option, i.e., more likely to 
take risks, when making capital investment decisions. I also predict that a large 
(compared to small) amount of reserves induces managers to invest in a risky option 
because it results in a lower perceived risk of missing a relevant earnings target. In turn, 
this makes the perceived risk of investing in the risky option lower. The formal 
hypotheses are stated as follows:  
Hypothesis 1: Managers are more likely to take risks in capital investment 
 decisions when the amount of reserves is large than when the amount of reserves 
 is small.    
 
Hypothesis 2: Managers’ perceived risk of missing the relevant earnings target 
 and perceived risk of investing in the risky option sequentially mediates the 
 predicted relationship between the reserves amount and managerial risk-taking.   
 
The predicted effects in H1 and H2 are shown in Figure 3.1.  
3.3 Source of relevant earnings targets 
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As discussed previously, managers perceive reserves as being helpful to their firm 
in achieving a desired outcome, specifically, meeting a relevant earnings target. In 
practice, a relevant earnings target could be determined by parties internal and/or external 
to a particular firm (i.e., source of earnings targets).3 For example, management earnings 
guidance could serve as an internally determined earnings target because it is voluntarily 
disclosed by managers to provide market participants with information about expected 
earnings for a firm (Miller 2002; Hirst et al. 2007; Chen et al. 2016). Managers have 
great discretion over the disclosure of such earnings information (Hirst et al. 2008; Elliott 
et al. 2011). Once a firm issues an earnings guidance, firm managers often make an 
implicit commitment to realize the forecast earnings (Wang and Tan 2013). Alternatively, 
an analyst (consensus) earnings forecast is an externally determined earnings target 
because it is estimated by the sell side of Wall Street and other investment communities. 
Analysts who follow a particular firm issue forecasts relating to the firm’s earnings and 
thus provide information to aid market participants in their investment decisions (Kadous 
et al. 2009).4 
Managers can perceive different levels of control regarding the achievement of a 
relevant earnings target depending on whether this target is internally or externally 
 
3 Academic and professional literature has identified multiple types of earnings targets 
that managers strive to achieve, including “zero” (i.e., avoiding losses or reporting 
profits), the previous period’s earnings (e.g., the same quarter last year EPS), 
management earnings forecasts, analyst earnings forecasts, and even earnings 
benchmarks specified in executive compensation contrasts (e.g., Dechow and Skinner 
2000; Mohanram 2003; Graham et al. 2005; Hirst et al. 2008). 
4 I acknowledge the fact that management earnings guidance can influence analyst 
earnings forecasts (e.g., Das et al. 2011; Versano and Trueman 2016). However, when 
analyst earnings forecasts serve as the earnings benchmark, analysts are still the ones who 
determine this benchmark, even though their earnings forecasts are influenced by 
managers’ earnings forecasts.  
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determined. According to the goal-setting literature (Locke and Latham 1990, 2002), 
managers facing an internally determined earnings target could perceive themselves as 
being competent and likely to meet the target and thus perceive themselves as having 
control over meeting the target (Bandura 1977; Locke and Latham 1990; Skinner 1996).5 
However, perceived control is less likely to result from having an externally determined 
earnings target.  
When the amount of reserves is small, the source of a relevant earnings target 
(i.e., whether a relevant earnings target is internally or externally determined) may not 
influence managerial risk-taking. Specifically, a small (compared to large) amount of 
reserves is less likely to help a firm achieve its relevant earnings target. When a relevant 
earnings target is less, or even when it is not likely to be achieved at all, the goal of 
managers is no longer to achieve the target. Rather, managers are likely to choose to take 
an “earnings bath” to increase future available reserves (Abarbanell and Lehavy 2003). 
When the amount of reserves is large, on the one hand, the source of a relevant 
earnings target can potentially influence managerial risk-taking differently, depending on 
whether an earnings target is determined internally or externally. As discussed previously 
when developing the hypotheses, I expect a large (compared to small) amount of reserves 
to increase managers’ perceived control (i.e., the affective dimension of perceived risk) to 
a greater extent which, eventually, leads to greater managerial risk-taking. The perceived 
control induced by an internally determined earnings target, rather than an externally 
determined earnings target, is more likely to enhance the level of perceived control 
already induced by having a large amount of reserves. Therefore, with a large amount of 
 
5 A relevant earnings target is a goal that firm managers attempt to achieve. 
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reserves, managers could be even more likely to take risks when a relevant earnings 
target is determined internally rather than externally. On the other hand, the source of a 
relevant earnings target may not in fact influence managerial risk-taking differently. 
Specifically, the impact of having a large amount of reserves on managers’ perceived 
control could be strong enough to override any difference in the level of perceived 
control caused by having a relevant earnings target determined internally versus 
externally. Taken together, the discussion above leads to my research question:  
Research Question: Does the source of a relevant earnings target influence the 
 impact of the reserves amount on managerial risk-taking? 
  
16 
 
 
Figure 3.1 Predicted model  
Based on my predictions in this study, the reserves amount influences managerial risk-
taking through affecting managers’ perceived risk of missing the relevant earnings target 
and managers’ perceived risk of investing in the risky option sequentially. 
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CHAPTER 4 
EXPERIMENTAL MATERIALS
4.1 Participants  
I recruited 303 participants from Amazon’s Mechanical Turk platform. In order to 
participate in this study, I required participants to be at least 25 years of age, have at least 
five years of full-time work experience, and have taken at least two accounting courses. I 
paid participants $0.50 plus a $0.25 bonus for correctly answering relevant attention-
check questions at the end of the study; the purpose of this was to encourage participants 
to focus greater attention on the experimental materials through an incentive. On average, 
participants are 39.64 years of age and have 17.42 years of full-time working experience. 
Participants have taken an average of 3.65 accounting courses and 3.41 finance courses. 
Fifty nine percent of participants are male.   
4.2 Experimental case  
I employed a 2 × 2 between-subjects factorial design in which I manipulated the 
reserves amount (at two levels: large versus small) and the source of earnings targets (at 
two levels: internal versus external). I also included two control conditions in which only 
the source of earnings target, and not the reserves amount, was manipulated.  
Each participant assumes the role of a financial executive at a hypothetical 
manufacturing company. Participants first review background information about the 
company and their responsibilities, including making machine selection decisions on 
behalf of the company. Participants then read information about two proposed machines 
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that differ in probability-weighted expected returns and risk levels (“Machine X” and 
“Machine Y”). By design, the estimated useful life of Machine X and Machine Y is the 
same. Machine X is expected to generate a certain return of $25 million for the company 
during its estimated useful life. Machine Y is expected to generate a probability-weighted 
return of $26 million (30 percent chance of a $61 million return and 70 percent chance of 
an $11 million return), which is slightly higher than the expected return generated by 
Machine X. This design is intended to make investing in Machine Y a riskier and more 
economically efficient capital investment decision. Following the provision of basic 
information about each machine, additional information is provided to participants to 
further explain why investing in Machine Y is riskier. Specifically, on the one hand, 
investing in Machine Y could potentially more than double the expected return generated 
by Machine X, possibly making it easier for the company to meet its relevant earnings 
target in the future. On the other hand, investing in Machine Y could potentially result in 
cutting the expected return generated by Machine X by more than half, possibly making 
it hard for the company to meet its relevant earnings target in the future.    
Next, participants review information about how the company’s relevant earnings 
target is determined. This contains the manipulation of the source of earnings targets at 
two levels: internal versus external. In the INTERNAL (EXTERNAL) earnings target 
condition, the relevant earnings target is determined by parties internal (external) to the 
company. Specifically, in the INTERNAL earnings target condition, participants read the 
following information:  
“In the Company, the total profit goal typically is set based on your and other 
 executives’ expectations about the Company’s profitability. Therefore, you have 
 substantial influence over deciding how high or low the total profit goal can be. 
 The total profit goal is always communicated to the public after it is set.”  
19 
In the EXTERNAL earnings target condition, participants read the following: 
 “In the Company, the total profit goal typically is set based on Wall Street 
 analysts’ expectations about the Company’s profitability. Therefore, you have 
 little or no influence over deciding how high or low the total profit goal can be. 
 The total profit goal is always communicated to the public after it is set.” 
 
Participants are then informed that failing to achieve the relevant earnings target could 
lead to numerous consequences for their company and themselves. Specifically, four 
potential consequences are listed, including a decline in stock price, inquiries emanating 
from investors, the expending of time to explain reasons for the shortfall, and damage to 
personal reputations.6  
Next, participants read information regarding the amount of reserves currently 
reported in their company’s balance sheet. This contains the manipulation of the reserves 
amount at two levels: large versus small. The specific example of reserves used in the 
experimental materials is for the allowances for bad debts. This is a typical reserve 
account recognized by prior academic and professional literatures (e.g., Magrath and 
Weld 2002; Nelson et al. 2002, 2003; Jackson and Liu 2010). In the LARGE (SMALL) 
reserves condition, participants are told that the company currently has a large (small) 
amount as the allowance reported in its balance sheet and that this large (small) amount 
 
6 The first two consequences, namely, a decrease in stock price and inquiries from 
investors, are potentially negative consequences for the company. They are also the top 
two consequences identified by financial managers who participated in the survey 
conducted by Graham et al. (2005), namely, missing relevant earnings targets. The third 
negative consequence is the time required to explain why the shortfalls occurred. This is 
for managers themselves, i.e., participants themselves, and it is the third consequence 
identified in Graham et al. (2005)’s survey. The last consequence, damage to personal 
reputations, is for managers themselves, i.e., the participants themselves, and is 
frequently mentioned in extant accounting literature as a consequence of missing a 
relevant earnings target (e.g., Watts and Zimmerman 1990; Healy and Wahlen 1999; 
Watts 2003). 
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of allowance could influence the company’s future earnings and, eventually, influence 
the achievement of a relevant earnings target. Specifically, in the LARGE reserves 
condition, participants are provided with the following information:  
 “You notice that the Company currently has a large amount of allowance for bad 
 debts, which is an estimation of receivables that will not be collected from 
 customers. If this large amount of allowance for bad debts decreases in the future, 
 the Company’s total profit will increase by a large amount. This large increase in 
 total profit is likely to help the Company meet its future total profit goal even 
 if a profit of $11 million is generated by investing in Machine Y.”   
 
In the SMALL reserves condition, participants are provided with the following 
information:  
 “You notice that the Company currently has a small amount of allowance for bad 
 debts, which is an estimation of receivables that will not be collected from 
 customers. If this small amount of allowance for bad debts decreases in the future, 
 the Company’s total profit will increase by a small amount. This small increase in 
 total profit is NOT likely to help the Company meet its future total profit goal 
 if a profit of $11 million is generated by investing in Machine Y.” 
 
After reading the information about the allowance for bad debts, participants are 
asked to make a machine selection decision—selecting one machine between the two 
proposed machines (Machine X and Machine Y). Managerial risk-taking is manifested in 
participants’ preferences for selecting Machine Y (the higher-risk machine) over Machine 
X (the lower-risk machine). Participants indicate their preferences on a 101-point scale 
with endpoints of -50 (“I would definitely select Machine X”) and +50 (“I would 
definitely select Machine Y”).  
Participants are then required to answer two questions to measure their perceived 
risk of missing the relevant earnings target in the future and their perceived risk of 
investing in the higher-risk machine (i.e., Machine Y). I adapt a measurement question 
from Nordgren et al. (2007) and Knechel et al. (2010) based on the decision context used 
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in my experimental materials. Specifically, participants’ perceived risk of missing the 
relevant earnings target is assessed by asking, “How great is the risk that the Company 
will not meet its total profit goal in the future?” on a 101-point scale from -50 (Extremely 
small) to +50 (Extremely great). Participants’ perceived risk of investing in the higher-
risk machine is assessed by asking, “How great is the risk of investing in Machine Y?” on 
a 101-point scale from -50 (Extremely small) to +50 (Extremely great).7 
Participants are also required to respond to two statements intended to measure 
whether they perceive reserves as a backup plan when their company’ reported earnings 
fall short of the relevant earnings target. I reframed the backup plans as either a “safety 
net” or an “insurance” according to prior psychology studies on backup plans (Napolitano 
and Freund 2015, 2016; Shin and Milkman 2016). Therefore, the two statements are “I 
feel that the allowance for bad debts could serve as a safety net to prevent the Company 
from missing its total profit goal in the future if it decreases” and “I feel that the 
allowance for bad debts could serve as an insurance to prevent the Company from 
missing its total profit goal in the future if it decreases.” After reading each statement, 
participants indicate the extent to which they agree or disagree with the statement on a 
101-point scale from -50 (Strongly disagree) to +50 (Strongly agree).8 
Finally, participants complete a post-experimental questionnaire. This includes 
manipulation checks, attention checks, a question about their general risk preference, a 
question about their previous capital investment experience, and demographic questions.9 
 
7 The order of the two questions was randomized when shown to participants.  
8 The order of the two questions was randomized when shown to participants.  
9 The prior literature shows that individuals’ general risk preference and previous training 
and experience in specific risk-taking situations can affect their risk-taking behavior 
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The procedures described in this section are summarized and presented in Panel A, 
Figure 4.1.  
4.3 Control conditions 
 I included two control conditions in which only the source of earnings targets was 
manipulated. Therefore, participants in the two control conditions were not provided with 
(1) information about the allowance for bad debts currently reported in a company’s 
balance sheet or (2) the two statements intended to measure perceived backup plans. The 
experimental procedures for the control conditions are summarized and presented in 
Panel B, Figure 4.1.  
  
 
(Olsen 2012). The prior literature also suggests that a manager’s age and gender have an 
impact on their risk-taking behavior in business settings (Serfling 2014).  
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Figure 4.1 Experimental procedures  
This figure comprehensively depicts the procedures used in the experimental conditions 
and the control conditions. Overall, a 2 × 2 + 2 experimental design was employed in my 
study. In the four experimental conditions, both the source of earnings targets and the 
reserves amount were manipulated. In the two control conditions, only the source of 
earnings targets was manipulated. Panel A shows the procedures used in the experimental 
materials for the four experimental conditions. Panel B shows the procedures used in the 
experimental materials for the two control conditions.  
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CHAPTER 5 
RESULTS
5.1 Tests of hypothesis—H1  
 I provide descriptive statistics and depict participants’ preferences for selecting 
Machine Y over Machine X in Table 5.1 and Figure 5.1. The pattern of means is 
consistent with my expectations as to the impact of the reserves amount on managerial 
risk-taking. Specifically, when the amount of reserves is large, participants’ mean 
preference for selecting Machine Y over Machine X is 4.99. In contrast, when the amount 
of reserves is small, participants’ mean preference for selecting Machine Y over Machine 
X is -18.13.  
I formally test my prediction using ANOVA, with the preference for selecting 
Machine Y over Machine X as the dependent measure. I report ANOVA results in Table 
5.2. H1 predicts that managers are more likely to select Machine Y over Machine X when 
the amount of reserves is large compared with when the amount of reserves is small. 
Consistent with H1, ANOVA results in Table 5.2 indicate a significant main effect for the 
reserves amount (p-value < 0.01, one-tailed). Therefore, H1 is supported.10  
5.2 Mediation analysis—H2 
 
10 Throughout this study, all inferences and conclusions do not change when participants 
who miss the manipulation check are excluded from the analyses. In addition, all the 
inferences and conclusions do not change when control variables, including participants’ 
general risk-taking preferences, previous experience with making capital investment 
decisions, age, and gender, are included in the analyses.  
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In H2, I predict that the reserves amount influences managers’ preferences for 
selecting Machine Y over Machine X sequentially through managers’ perceived risk of 
missing the relevant earnings target and managers’ perceived risk of investing in Machine 
Y. That is, H2 predicts a causal sequence in which the reserves amount influences 
managers’ perceived risk of missing the relevant earnings target which, in turn, 
influences managers’ perceived risk of investing in Machine Y. This then influences 
managers’ preferences for selecting Machine Y over Machine X. To test H2, I conducted 
a sequential mediation analysis using the SPSS PROCESS macro (Model 6), following 
the procedures described by Hayes (2009, 2017). The sequential mediation model tests 
whether there is a significant indirect effect resulting from the causal relationship 
between the two sequential mediators. Figure 5.2 illustrates the paths for the proposed 
sequential mediation model, including the related path coefficients with indicators of 
significance. In Table 5.3, Panel A and Panel B, I provide descriptive statistics for the 
mediating variables. Additionally, I report the model’s path coefficients and the indirect 
effects in Table 5.3, Panel C and Panel D, respectively.   
When I test for mediation, the indirect effect of the reserves amount on 
managerial preferences for selecting Machine Y over Machine X, through both 
managers’ perceived risk of missing the relevant earnings target and managers’ perceived 
risk of investing in Machine Y, is significant (95 percent CI = LL: 0.18; UL: 2.87; the 
confidence interval does not include zero). Therefore, H2 is supported.  
Apart from the predicted significant effect of the reserves amount on managerial 
preferences for selecting Machine Y over Machine X through both mediators, the 
mediation analysis indicates two other significant relationships that are not predicted in 
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the study. First, the mediation analysis shows a significant direct influence of the reserves 
amount on managers’ preferences for selecting Machine Y over Machine X (95 percent 
CI = LL: 16.16; UL: 35.12; the confidence interval does not include zero). Since reserves 
could affect future reported earnings, this result suggests that managers consider whether 
and how their decisions will influence future earnings when making capital investment 
decisions. Second, the mediation analysis shows a significant impact of the reserves 
amount on managers’ preferences for selecting Machine Y over Machine X through 
managers’ perceived risk of missing the relevant earnings target only (95 percent CI = 
LL: -7.42; UL: -0.65; the confidence interval does not include zero). This is because the 
perceived risk of missing the relevant earnings target may provide additional information 
to managers about the nature of the current environment (Kim et al. 2015). When the 
amount of reserves is large, a lower perceived risk of missing the relevant earnings target 
signals a less risky environment and subsequently facilitates a risk-taking tendency 
(Peltzman 1975; Wilde 1982; Stetzer and Hofmann 1996; Hedlund 2000). This risk-
taking tendency is reflected in managers’ selection preferences for Machine Y over 
Machine X in my experimental context.  
5.3 Test of research question 
The research question asks whether the source of relevant earnings targets 
influences the way the reserves amount affects managerial risk-taking. In other words, the 
research question asks whether there is an interaction between the reserves amount and 
the source of earnings targets. ANOVA results in Table 5.2 show an insignificant 
interaction effect for the reserves amount and the source of earnings targets (p-value = 
0.41, one-tailed). Therefore, whether a relevant earnings target is determined internally or 
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externally is not a factor that influences the impact of the reserves amount on managerial 
risk-taking.  
5.4 Additional tests 
5.4.1 Perceived backup plan measures 
I included two items in the experimental materials to assess whether participants 
perceive reserves as a backup plan to help their company avoid missing relevant earnings 
targets. As shown in Table 5.4, I find that the mean response to the statement “I feel that 
the allowance for bad debts could serve as a safety net to prevent the Company from 
missing its total profit goal in the future if it decreases” is significantly greater in the 
LARGE reserves condition (19.17) than in the SMALL reserves condition (1.23) (p-value 
< 0.01, one-tailed). The mean response to the statement “I feel that the allowance for bad 
debts could serve as an insurance to prevent the Company from missing its total profit 
goal in the future if it decreases” is significantly greater in the LARGE reserves condition 
(17.74) than in the SMALL reserves condition (-1.04) (p-value < 0.01, one-tailed). 
Additionally, both mean responses in the LARGE reserves condition, 19.17 and 17.74, 
are significantly greater than zero, which is the middle point of the 101-point scale used 
to measure perceived backup plans. However, both mean responses in the SMALL 
reserves condition, 1.23 and -1.04, are not significantly different from zero, which is the 
middle point of the 101-point scale used to measure perceived backup plans.  
The conclusion to be reached from the findings discussed above is that 
participants view a large amount of reserves as a backup plan to help their company meet 
relevant earnings targets, but a small amount of reserves does not constitute a backup 
plan. This result provides initial evidence that reserves are perceived as a backup plan by 
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managers in the event of earnings shortfalls, but only when the amount is large. These 
findings therefore enrich the prior accounting literature that largely focuses only on the 
existence of reserves. Since a large amount of reserves makes a firm more likely to 
achieve its earnings targets, this result suggests that it might not be the existence of 
reserves, but rather the likelihood that reserves will inflate reported earnings in the course 
of achieving earnings targets, that influences managers’ judgments and decision-making. 
5.4.2 Reserves amount—large, small, no 
 Two control conditions were included in the experimental materials while no 
information about reserves was provided to participants. Therefore, these two control 
conditions together create a condition labeled as “NO”. Under the “NO” condition the 
amount of reserves is zero.  
 Panel A, Table 5.5 shows that participants’ mean preference for selecting 
Machine Y over Machine X in the LARGE reserves condition (4.99) is significantly 
greater than participants’ mean preference for selecting Machine Y over Machine X in 
the NO reserves condition (-9.92) (p-value < 0.01, one-tailed). Additionally, participants’ 
mean preference for selecting Machine Y over Machine X in the SMALL reserves 
condition (-18.13) is marginally significantly lower than participants’ mean preference 
for selecting Machine Y over Machine X in the NO reserves condition (-9.92) (Panel B, 
Table 5.5; p-value = 0.05, one-tailed).  
These results are interesting for two reasons. First, they provide further evidence 
that the amount of reserves, rather than the existence of reserves, might be the factor that 
influences managers’ judgments and decisions. Second, participants are even less likely 
to take risks when the amount of reserves is small compared with when no reserves exist. 
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The results discussed in Section 5.3.1 may explain this interesting finding. Specifically, 
the results in Section 5.3.1 show that participants do not view a small amount of reserves 
as a backup plan that helps their company meet a relevant earnings target. Therefore, 
when the amount of reserves is small or when no reserves exist at all, participants do not 
perceive the existence of a backup plan. In this situation, according to agency theory 
(e.g., Jensen and Meckling 1976), participants will be more likely to select Machine X, 
the lower-risk capital investment option. Participants in the SMALL reserves condition 
are even more likely to select Machine X than participants in the NO reserves condition 
because Machine X may be perceived by participants as even more favorable when a 
small amount of reserves still may not help a company to meet its earnings targets if 
Machine Y is selected compared with when no reserves exist.  
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Table 5.1 Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
The experiment manipulated two variables at two levels each. The reserves amount was 
manipulated between subjects as either large or small. The source of relevant earnings 
targets was manipulated between subjects as either internal or external. The dependent 
variable, managerial risk-taking, was elicited as follows: “Once you have carefully 
considered the information provided previously, think about which of the two proposed 
machines you would select… Moving the slider to the left indicates your preference that 
you would select Machine X and moving the slider to the right indicates your preference 
that you would select Machine Y.” The response was measured on a 101-point scale with 
the left endpoint labeled “I would definitely select Machine X” and the right endpoint 
labeled “I would definitely select Machine Y.”   
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Table 5.2 Analysis of Variance Results (n = 206) 
 
 
The experiment manipulated two variables at two levels each. The reserves amount was 
manipulated between subjects as either large (coded as 1) or small (coded as 0). The 
variable is referred to as AMOUNT. The source of earnings targets was manipulated 
between subjects as either internal (coded as 1) or external (coded as 0).  This variable is 
referred to as SOURCE. The dependent variable, managerial risk-taking, was elicited as 
follows: “Once you have carefully considered the information provided previously, think 
about which of the two proposed machines you would select… Moving the slider to the 
left indicates your preference that you would select Machine X and moving the slider to 
the right indicates your preference that you would select Machine Y.” The response was 
measured on a 101-point scale with the left endpoint labeled “I would definitely select 
Machine X” and the right endpoint labeled “I would definitely select Machine Y.”  Note: 
Expectation is directional; p-value is equivalent to a one-tailed test. 
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Table 5.3 Sequential Mediation Analysis 
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Table 5.4 Results for Perceived Backup Plans 
 
 
The experiment manipulated the reserves amount between subjects as either large or 
small. The response scale to both statements is a 101-point scale with the left endpoint 
labeled “Strongly Disagree” and the right endpoint labeled “Strongly Agree.”   
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Table 5.5 Results for the Reserves Amount Manipulation 
 
 
The experiment manipulated the reserves amount between subjects as either large or 
small. In the control conditions, no information was provided regarding the amount of 
reserves. The dependent variable, managerial risk-taking, was elicited as follows: “Once 
you have carefully considered the information provided previously, think about which of 
the two proposed machines you would select… Moving the slider to the left indicates 
your preference that you would select Machine X and moving the slider to the right 
indicates your preference that you would select Machine Y.” The response is measured 
on a 101-point scale with the left endpoint labeled “I would definitely select Machine X” 
and the right endpoint labeled “I would definitely select Machine Y.” 
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Figure 5.1 Graphical representation of results  
This figure presents the participants’ preferences for selecting Machine Y over Machine 
X by experimental condition. These results are also reported in Table 1. The experiment 
manipulated two variables at two levels each. The reserves amount was manipulated 
between subjects as either large or small. The source of earnings targets was manipulated 
between subjects as either internal or external. The dependent variable, managerial risk-
taking, was elicited as follows: “Once you have carefully considered the information 
provided previously, think about which of the two proposed machines you would 
select… Moving the slider to the left indicates your preference that you would select 
Machine X and moving the slider to the right indicates your preference that you would 
select Machine Y.” The response was measured on a 101-point scale with the left 
endpoint labeled “I would definitely select Machine X” and the right endpoint labeled “I 
would definitely select Machine Y.”   
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Figure 5.2 Sequential mediation model 
This figure is an illustration of the sequential mediation model with the perceived risk of 
missing the relevant earnings target (M1) and the perceived risk of investing in Machine 
Y (M2) as causally linked sequential mediators for the relationship between the reserves 
amount (X) and participants’ preferences for selecting Machine Y over Machine X (Y). 
Analysis was conducted using the SPSS PROCESS macro (Model 6) following the 
procedures described by Hayes (2009, 2017). Path coefficients are reported above each 
path label in the figure. An asterisk on the path coefficient indicates that the path is 
significant based on a 95 percent confidence interval. Dotted lines represent paths that are 
not formally predicted in my study. Path coefficients, indirect effects, and confidence 
intervals are also reported in Table 3. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSIONS
I report the results of an experiment that informs our understanding of (1) The 
impact of reserves on managerial risk-taking in a decision context surrounding the 
making of capital investment decisions and (2) Managers’ perceptions of reserves. First, 
managers are more likely to undertake a higher-risk capital investment option when the 
amount of reserves currently reported in their firm’s balance sheet is large compared with 
when it is small. As a higher-risk capital investment option is also expected to generate a 
higher return, this result suggests that a large amount of reserves facilitates economically 
efficient managerial risk-taking in terms of capital investment decisions. Efficient 
managerial risk-taking is desirable because it potentially reduces agency costs in the 
shareholder-manager relationship (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Eisenhardt 1989; Baiman 
1990). The result also suggests that having a large amount of reserves currently reported 
could bring long-term payouts for firms by inducing managers to undertake high-risk and 
high-return capital investments, even though reserves might be used by managers 
opportunistically to achieve short-term earnings objectives in the future. By showing that 
a large amount of reserves could result in long-term payouts for firms, this study sheds 
lights on the questions raised by the prior literature as to whether accounting discretion 
helps align managers’ incentives with those of shareholders and whether accounting 
discretion results in higher economic payouts (e.g., Fields et al. 2001; Libby et al. 2015).  
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 Second, reserves influence managerial risk-taking through sequentially 
influencing managers’ perceived risk of missing a relevant earnings target and managers’ 
perceived risk of investing in a risky capital investment option. This result provides 
evidence as to why reserves influence managerial risk-taking by examining the 
psychological consequences of having reserves currently reported in a firm’s balance 
sheet. Knowing that reserves could be released in the future to help achieve a firm’s 
relevant earnings target, managers feel safe about making a decision that involves risky 
options.  
Finally, managers appear to view a large amount of reserves as a backup plan to 
help their firm achieve relevant earnings targets in the event of earnings shortfalls. 
However, managers may not perceive a small amount of reserves as a backup plan. These 
results provide initial evidence that reserves are perceived as a backup plan by managers 
only when their amount is large. By providing this evidence, this study therefore extends 
the prior accounting literature that previously has primarily discussed the existence of 
reserves. In addition, these results extend the prior psychology literature relating to 
backup plans (e.g., Napolitano and Freund 2015, 2016, 2017; Shin and Milkman 2016). 
Specifically, prior psychology studies focus only on the existence of a backup plan, that 
is, having a backup plan in place versus not having a backup plan in place. Due to the 
characteristics of reserves, and having regard to the fact that their amounts can vary, and 
also having regard to the fact that the likelihood of achieving desire goals can vary, I 
have been further able to examine how backup plans influence individual behavior when 
the backup plans are predominantly efficient in assisting in the pursuit of goals.    
39 
 My study is not without limitations. First, regarding the experimental materials, 
the manipulation of the reserves amount was implemented by explicitly stating that the 
company in focus has a large (or small) amount of the allowances for bad debts. There 
were no actual dollar amounts provided to illustrate whether the amount of reserves is 
large or small. This design choice was adopted because the aim is to employ a between-
subjects design. Future studies can employ a within-subjects design in which both the 
large absolute dollar amount and the small absolute dollar amount of reserves will be 
provided to each participant. Second, the results suggest that a small amount of reserves 
is not viewed by participants as a backup plan to help achieve a relevant earnings target 
and does not facilitate managerial risk-taking in the making of capital investment 
decisions. This result is both surprising and interesting because it is inconsistent with 
prior survey/interview evidence to the effect that reserves are maintained and booked as a 
cushion against potential earnings hits (see Section 2.3 for a detailed discussion of prior 
evidence). Future research can investigate how managers perceive a small amount of 
reserves and how a small amount of reserves might influence managerial judgments and 
decision-making.  
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